Last week’s decision by the Federal Circuit regarding the pleading requirements for an inequitable conduct claim, Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17311 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2009), and the Supreme Court’s decision earlier this summer in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) may foreshadow additional enhanced pleading requirements in patent infringement cases.
Robert Matthews at Mathews Patent-Law Consulting has published a detailed analysis of Exergen that can be found here. In short, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9, a claim of inequitable conduct must include specific identification of the who, what, when, where and how of the material misrepresentation committed before the PTO. As Matthews states, under Exergen, “an accused infringer must identify the exact information within a withheld prior art reference that it alleges is material, identify where that information can be found in the reference, identify the particular claim limitations or combination of claim limitations for which the withheld information is material, and then show how the prosecution record lacked that information.”
An accused infringer must also identify by name the specific individual who allegedly knew of the allegedly material information and withheld or misrepresented that information to the PTO. A party may plead “on information and belief” but only if essential information lies within another party’s control and only if the pleading sets forth specific facts upon which the belief is reasonably based. Thus, the mere fact that an applicant disclosed a reference while prosecuting one application but did not disclose the same reference while prosecuting a second application is insufficient to plead the requirement of deceptive intent.
Exergen echoes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) that under Fed.R.Civ. P. 8, a pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of a cause of action will not do.” As the Court stated in Iqbal, “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Thus, a plaintiff must make “well-pleaded factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Exergen takes Iqbal and Twombly a step further, requiring allegation of facts with a high degree of specificity and detail, and Exergen may presage stricter pleading requirements for other types of patent claims and defenses.
So far, though, the Federal Circuit has not required stricter pleading of patent infringement claims. Applying Twombly, the Federal Circuit has held that a claim for patent infringement must only assert that the plaintiff owns the patent and that the defendant infringed the patent, must describe, in general terms, “the means by which the patent was infringed” and must identify the specific parts of patent law that are implicated. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A patentee “is not required to specifically include each element of the claims of the asserted patent." Thus, here in Virginia, Judge Payne has held that a plaintiff satisfies McZeal by identifying the infringing devices at issue. Taltwell, LLC v. Zonet USA Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93465 at *40 (E.D.Va. Dec. 20, 2007). Judge Dyk dissented in McZeal, arguing that a patentee should be required to specify which claims are infringed and the features of the accused device that correspond to the claim limitations, and Iqbal arguably supports Judge Dyk’s position. At this point, though, it appears that the Federal Circuit will not impose stricter requirements for pleading patent infringement, even though a plaintiff’s Rule 11 obligations requires a detailed infringement analysis before suit is filed and such information often must be provided in a claim chart filed early in the case.
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