Defendant Sanctioned for Improper Motion to Dismiss Based Upon Defense of Res Judicata

In Heinz Kettler Gmbh v. Little Tikes Co., Civil Action No. 2:09cv500 (E.D. Va.), Judge Doumar denied Little Tikes’ motion to dismiss Kettler’s claims for patent infringement and awarded sanctions against Little Tikes for filing the motion to dismiss in the first place.  The case against Little Tikes follows an earlier case that Kettler brought against Rand International and Little Tikes, Heinz Kellter GmbH v. Rand International, Case No. 1:08cv679 (E.D. Va.), for infringement of Kettler’s patents by certain tricycles sold by Rand International and Little Tikes.  In that case, Kettler agreed to dismiss its claims against Little Tikes relating to the Ofrat Model No. 129H tricycle at issue based upon Little Tikes’ multiple representations, in discovery responses and correspondence from Little Tikes’ counsel, that Little Tikes and did not manufacture, sell or distribute the Ofrat Model No. 129H tricycles, and that Little Tikes was nothing more than a trademark licensor.  Kettler later learned that these representations were, “at best, misinformation” (according to Judge Doumar), and brought suit against Little Tikes and its parent, MGA Entertainment, Inc., for patent infringement by Little Tikes’ Product No. 615221

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False Marking Penalties Dramatically Increased by Recent Federal Circuit Decision

 On December 30, 2009, the Federal Circuit in The Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Company, issued a unanimous decision establishing a new standard for assessing the size of the penalty in an action for false patent marking.  This is a potentially significant development in the area of false patent marking. A full discussion of Forest Group, authored by James Moore Bollinger, George B. Snyder and Laura E. Krawczyk, can be found here.

In Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., No 1:07cv897-LMB/TCB (E.D. Va.), which we discussed in April 2009 (see link), Judge Brinkema initially denied Solo Cup’s motion to dismiss, but later granted summary judgment to Solo Cups upon finding that Solo lacked an intent to deceive the public given its reasonable reliance on advice of counsel in deciding to replace patent-marking molds with non-marking molds in a gradual fashion. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp.2d 790, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76032 (E.D. Va. August 25, 2009). Significantly, Judge Brinkema also held that an "offense" under the statute is the overall decision to mark improperly and rejected Pequignot’s argument that Solo should be penalized for each and every lid it marked. This decision by Brinkema may not stand given the logic of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Forest Group.

 

Attorneys Join Troutman Sanders Intellectual Property Practice

The law firm of Troutman Sanders LLP is pleased to announce the addition of James “Jim” Moore Bollinger as partner, Xin “Kevin” He as of counsel, and Laura E. Krawczyk as an associate to its Intellectual Property practice group, bolstering the presence of this group firm-wide and particularly in New York.

Prior to joining Troutman Sanders, all three attorneys worked for Morgan Lewis in New York. Jim was a partner in Morgan Lewis’ Litigation Practice, leader of the firm’s Intellectual Property Practice in New York, and co-head of the firm’s financial patent initiative. Kevin was an associate at the firm and practiced in the firm’s Litigation, Intellectual Property and Greater China Practices, and Laura was an associate in the firm’s Litigation and Intellectual Property Practices.

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ED Va makes patent filings top 10 in 2009

LegalMetric, an intellectual property case law research and analysis company, recently released its list of district courts in which the most patent cases were filed in 2009.  That the Central District of California and Eastern District of Texas came in first and second, respectively, probably won't surprise any IP litigators.  Our own Eastern District of Virginia (the "Rocket Docket") placed tenth.

LegalMetric Director of Research Greg Upchurch, in a conversation with this author, stated that LegalMetric does a bulk download every quarter of every case identified in PACER as a patent case.  The company's business focuses on analyzing IP decisions so as to enable litigators to evaluate how particular courts, judges, and issues may impact their case.  Statistics like the 2009 patent filings list are a happy by-product of that business.

I think it's a great thing that there can be any degree of data mining from PACER and hope that the federal courts will continue to expand the ability to do queries and analysis.  In our electronic world, the data is there; the challenge is finding, organizing, and making good use of it.

Those interested in more information about the opportunities and challenges of litigating patent cases in the Eastern District of Virginia can check out past publications on that topic by my colleagues Robert Angle and Dabney Carr (listed under "Publications" on each's page or accessible directly here and here) and contact one of this blog's authors.

Karaoke lawsuit rocks Virginia

If you’ve ever been to a karaoke session and found yourself wanting to sue someone, here’s a lawsuit for you.
 
Just before Christmas, two related karaoke / sing-along entertainment manufacturing companies, one from North Carolina and one from Delaware, filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia (Alexandria Division) against an array of people and businesses who provide or host karaoke in the Northern Virginia and Richmond areas.  (Case no. 1:09-cv-01390; see copy of 41-page Complaint here.)

The lawsuit is an action for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1114 and 1125). 

The complaint alleges that, thanks to new technologies that make it possible to easily copy the special karaoke CDs, up to thirty illegitimate copies of new karaoke releases are created for each legitimate copy sold, causing significant losses and layoffs and an overall threat to the businesses of the two plaintiffs, Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. and Sound Choice Studios, Inc.  It further alleges that investigators for the plaintiffs “observed each of the Defendants possessing, using, or authorizing or benefiting from unauthorized counterfeit copies of at least one work bearing the” plaintiffs’ marks.

The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, the defendants’ profits, or statutory damages, treble or punitive damages, attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, and seizure of all media containing counterfeits.

No word yet on whether the lawsuit will have a soundtrack.
 

EDVA Rejects Insurance Coverage of Trademark Infringement Claim as "Advertising Injury"

Intellectual property claims are rarely covered by insurance, but some claims of trademark and copyright infringement may be covered by insurance for advertising injury.  In a January 5 decision, though, Magistrate Judge Lauck narrowly interpreted "advertising injury" coverage to exclude the duty to defend a trademark infringement claim. Premier Pet Products LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Am., Civil Action No. 3:09CV293 (Jan. 5, 2010).

In Premier Pet Products, Travelers issued an insurance policy to Premier that contained a “Web Xtend Liability” endorsement which provided coverage for “an offense committed in the course of advertising your goods, products or services” and defined advertising injury to include “infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”

Premier was sued for selling dog training collars bearing the plaintiff’s trademarked designations. The suit, however, did not specifically refer to Premier’s advertising. Rather, the plaintiff alleged liability based on Premier’s "sale" of products with plaintiff's trademarks and Premier's “use” of plaintiff’s trademarks and trade dress.

Travelers denied coverage, and Premier sued for breach of contract, seeking defense and indemnity under the policy. Judge Lauck granted summary judgment to Travelers on the duty to defend.

The key issue would appear to be whether the policy language covering “infringement of copyright, title or slogan” includes trademark infringement, and the parties extensively briefed a nationwide split of authority on that issue. Judge Lauck, though, did not reach that issue, holding instead that the Complaint did not allege (1) that Premier’s conduct occurred in the course of advertising its products, as the policy required; or (2) that Premier’s advertising activities caused the plaintiff’s harm.

On the first issue, Premier argued that the policy should be construed broadly, relying on a Fourth Circuit decision applying North Carolina law, State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Travelers, 343 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2003), which held that “the term ‘advertising’ normally refers to ‘[a]ny oral, written, or graphic statement made by the seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business.’”

Instead, Judge Lauck relied on an earlier EDVA case, Solers, Inc. v. Hartford, 146 F.Supp.2d 785, 793 (E.D.Va. 2001), which narrowly defined “advertising” under Virginia law to refer “unambiguously to the widespread definition of promotional material to the public at large, or at least to widely disseminated solicitation or promotion” and did not include one-on-one “solicitation.” The Complaint’s allegations of Premier’s “sale” of products and “use” of the plaintiff’s trademarks, the Court held “could not constitute advertising, or ‘widespread promotion’ (as opposed to sale) of goods.”

On the second issue, Judge Lauck held that the Complaint did not clearly allege that Premier’s advertising activities caused injury. Instead, the plaintiff alleged that Premier’s “sale” of products and “use” of infringing designations were the cause of its alleged injuries.

The same day, Judge Lauck issued a follow-up Order noting that she had not ruled on whether Travelers had a duty to indemnify under the policy and giving the parties thirty days to brief that issue.  Since the duty to indemnify is typically no broader than the duty to defend, though, there seems little chance that the result will change. 

Federal Circuit Reverses the Eastern District of Texas Twice More on Venue

Four times over the course of less than a year, the Federal Circuit has reversed a decision by the Eastern District of Texas (EDTex) denying a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Posts on the first two decisions, In re: TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and In re: Genentech, 566 F. 3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009), can be found here and here.

Last month, the Federal Circuit issued two more writs of mandamus reversing the EDTex for refusing to transfer a patent case to a different venue. See In re: Nintendo Co., Ltd., Misc. No. 914, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 27647 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2009); In re: Hoffman-La Roche Inc., Misc. No. 911, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 26244 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 2009).

In Hoffman, the Court reversed a decision by EDTex Chief Judge Folsom denying transfer of a pharmaceutical patent case to the Eastern District of North Carolina.

  • The Federal Circuit rejected the reasoning (which can be found in numerous EDTex cases) that where a case is “decentralized” because witnesses and documents are located across the country, transfer should be denied.
     
  • The court held that the district court improperly ignored the significant contrast between the strong connections the cause of action had with North Carolina, where the accused drug was developed, and the Eastern District of Texas, which had no factual connection to the case.
     
  • The Court also held that a plaintiff could not manipulate venue by transferring documents to litigation counsel in the EDTex, calling the assertion that these were “Texas” documents a “fiction” and characterizing the district court’s ruling as having “no legally rational basis.”

In Nintendo, the Court used similarly strong language in reversing a denial of transfer by Judge Davis, holding that “in a case featuring most witnesses and evidence closer to the transferee venue with few or no convenience factors favoring the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the trial court should grant a motion to transfer.”

  • Unlike Judge Folsom in Hoffman-La Roche, Judge Davis acknowledged that the Western District of Washington had a strong interest in the dispute, while the EDTex did not.
     
  • As in Hoffman-La Roche, the Federal Circuit rejected the reasoning that the EDTex was as convenient as any other forum because witnesses and documents were located in several locations. Instead, the Court should have more strongly considered the convenience of witnesses who must travel farther to reach the EDTex and the location of the Defendant’s documents in Washington.
     
  • The Federal Circuit also chided the EDTex court for glossing over a record “without a single relevant factor favoring the plaintiff’s chosen venue.”

Despite the strong messages that the Federal Circuit continues to send regarding venue motions in the EDTex, it remains to be seen whether the district judges will listen. Hoffman-La Roche and Nintendo will be helpful to sole defendants sued in the EDTex, but transfer will continue to remain difficult where there are multiple defendants in different forums.

Yes, Virginia, there is a cause of action for false advertising

            In the PBM Products v. Mead Johnson baby formula case (E.D. Va. case no. 3:09-cv-00269) twice previously mentioned on this blog (here and here), Chief Judge James R. Spencer delivered a gift to counsel on Christmas Eve, in the form of the second of two Christmas week opinions that provide a full discussion of and rationale for prior rulings. 

 

            This blog entry addresses a portion of that December 24th opinion [docket no. 243 on PACER/ECF, copy available here, also available at 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120200], which dealt with Mead Johnson’s summary judgment motion on PBM’s false advertising claims under the Lanham Act and for commercial disparagement under Virginia law.  The motion was denied on the former and granted on the latter.  A passage (on p.10) about the Virginia law claim may be somewhat startling at first:

 

            “As this Court has previously held, ‘the only claims for unfair competition recognized in Virginia are palming off and misappropriation of another's work.’  PBM Products. Inc. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 204 F.R.D. 71, 75 (E.D. Va. 2001).  Thus, Virginia does not recognize a cause of action for deceptive trade practices, such as false advertising.  See id.

 

            So, does this passage really mean that those who want to sue for “deceptive trade practices, such as false advertising,” are out of luck under Virginia law?  No, as explained below.

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