December GRIPLA Meeting and Annual Holiday Celebration (Guest Speaker: Robert L. Stoll, USPTO Commissioner for Patents)


December GRIPLA Meeting
and Annual Holiday Celebration

Guest Speaker:  
Robert L. Stoll, USPTO Commissioner for Patents

Tuesday, December 7th, 2010 at 5:00 PM
Cocktails and Hors d'oeuvres

LOCATION
Troutman Sanders LLP
1001 Haxall Point, 15th Floor
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Map/Directions

To RSVP or for questions, contact Natalie Toalson.

Sponsored by:

Thomson Reuters is the world's leading provider of intellectual property solutions.  Their offerings are used by professionals across the IP lifecycle to develop, maintain and extract maximum value from their intellectual assets.   For more information, contact Chris Tangang.

 

For more information about GRIPLA, the Greater Richmond Intellectual Property Law Association, please visit http://gripla.org.

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Proposed Amendments to the Eastern District of Virginia's Local Rules

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia made an announcement of proposed amendments to the Local Rules (which can be found here) and are seeking public comment. The notice is on the EDVA website found here.

The more substantive proposed changes include the following:

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Litigating Patent Infringement Cases in the Eastern District of Virginia - Markman Hearings

As the third in our series of posts following up on our article on litigating patent infringement cases in the Eastern District of Virginia (earlier posts can be found here and here), we want to make a few brief points about one of the key events in any patent case – claim construction and the Markman process. Claim construction is especially important in the EDVA because the seven to nine month schedule of the typical patent case makes the timing of a Markman hearing crucial.

The short summary of how the EDVA handles claim construction is that each judge does it differently. There are, however, similarities among the practices of the judges in each of the three divisions of the Court.

In the Alexandria Division, most of the district judges prefer to delay consideration of claim construction until the summary judgment stage. This practice is consistent with other civil cases in Alexandria, where non-dispositive motions are handled by a magistrate judge, and so the district judges tend to have little contact with cases until later in the litigation process. The prevailing view appears to be that claim construction issues are more ripe for determination later in the case, after the parties have conducted discovery and after the parties have had more time to consider settlement.

Some litigants prefer the approach in Alexandria, but in the EDVA, it creates a great deal of uncertainty because the deadline for summary judgment motions is less than two months before trial. The lack of a claim construction until the eve of trial not only makes settlement more difficult, but experts must prepare reports using alternative claim constructions, and trial strategy cannot be set until a decision is rendered, which can be within a week or two of trial.

In Richmond, the district judges are more involved in patent cases from the beginning. Unlike Alexandria, the district judges oversee the initial pre-trial conference and hear non-dispositive motions, including discovery motions. District judges are also more closely involved in the claim construction process. As a result, in Richmond, whether to hold a Markman hearing is typically addressed at the initial pre-trial conference, and Markman hearings usually occur three to four months after responsive pleadings are filed, before expert reports are filed and well before trial. While the Court does not always issue a claim construction before opening expert disclosures are due, that often occurs, simplifying expert reports and summary judgment motions, and allowing the parties more time to prepare trial strategies.

In Norfolk, like Alexandria, the district judges have less contact with patent cases until later in the litigation process. The clerk handles the initial pre-trial conference, and magistrate judges handle most non-dispositive motions. Markman hearings are not scheduled unless the parties request one by motion. In Norfolk, the time between the initial pre-trial conference and trial tends to be the shortest of the three divisions, often less than seven months. Thus, if a party wants the court to schedule an early Markman hearing, they are advised to request one as early as possible. Even then, it may be some time before they receive a ruling on their request. Unlike Alexandria, however, the district judges in Norfolk do not have as strong a preference for combining claim construction with the summary judgment process. As a result, the timing of Markman hearings in Norfolk cases vary from relatively early in the litigation process to as late as a few weeks before trial.

One thing the divisions share is the format for Markman hearings. Live testimony is rarely offered in civil hearings in the EDVA, and the same is true for Markman hearings. Thus, in most cases, Markman hearings last less than a day and resemble an appellate argument, supplemented by exhibits and perhaps PowerPoint presentations. Further, the EDVA judges all have experience with Markman hearings and are familiar with the standards for claim construction, and so litigants can expect judges to be well prepared and capable of understanding patent law concepts.

Lastly, parties should remember that while the EDVA judges all have tendencies and standard practices for handling claim construction, they all make exceptions in particular cases. While parties need to be alert to a judge’s practices, if requested early enough and supported by sound reasoning, all of the judges are open to suggestion about different approaches to Markman hearings.

Supreme Court Grants Cert to Decide the State of Mind Necessary for Induced Infringement

As we posted herethe Federal Circuit held in February that an accused infringer need not have actual knowledge of a patent to be liable for inducement of infringement. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010). That decision conflicted with the Federal Circuit’s en banc holding a little over three years earlier in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006), that “[t]he requirement that the alleged infringer knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringement necessarily includes the requirement that he or she knew of the patent.” The SEB panel danced around the DSU decision by stating that DSU did not set out the “metes and bounds” of the knowledge-of-the-patent requirement.

This morning, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari filed by two of the defendants in SEB to decide “Whether the legal standard for the ‘state of mind’ element of a claim for actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b) is ‘deliberate indifference of a known risk’ that an infringement may occur or instead ‘purposeful, culpable expression and conduct’ to encourage an infringement.” Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., cert. granted, Docket No. 10-6 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010).

The cert. petition can be found here, the opposition brief can be found here, and an amicus brief in support of granting cert. filed by 26 Law, Economics and Business Professors can be found here.

Recently-filed trademark cases in the E.D. Va. focus on Web and search tactics

This past week, three new trademark infringement cases were filed in the Eastern District of Virginia.  They span the Court's three divisions and all center on web and search engine related conduct.

The first, Mazelmints, Inc. v. It's A Wrap LLC et al (case no. 1:10-cv-01117 [-LO-TRJ]), was brought by the maker of lines of novelty mints named “Engagemints” and “Announcemints” (not to mention “BarMintsVah’s”).  (Complaint here.)  When the defendant sold “Engage-mints” and “Announce-mints” on its website, www.mymint-tins.com, things turned sour.  (Sorry, couldn’t help myself.)  Although a cease-and-desist letter got a response that the defendant had removed the offending items, Mazelmints claims that the defendant is still using the terms in website metadata – read and considered by search engines as they index the site.  Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, destruction of infringing products, and damages.  With the defendants in Kentucky and the plaintiff in Maryland, it’s not entirely clear why the case finds itself in the Eastern District.

We’ve blogged recently about the RosettaStone / Google brouhaha over companies paying Google to display their ads in response to searches for trademarks that they don’t own.  Is use of website “metadata” tags analytically different?  Will courts presume that meta tags create damage, or must a litigant prove the effect on search engine results?

The second, Franko-LaFratta Construction Inc. v. Classic Kitchens of Virginia, Inc. (case no. 3:10-cv-00723 [REP]), is a cybersquatting lawsuit between renovation and design/construction companies.  (Complaint here.)  The plaintiff claims that many of the 100 website names registered by defendant’s vice-president are his competitors’ names, including in this case various forms of frankolafratta.suffix (basically all of the common suffixes but “.com”).  According to an article in Richmond BizSense that’s an exhibit to the complaint, the defendant has done so with respect to the names of other competitors too, all to increase the traffic to and visibility of defendant’s website.

Finally, the third, Chanel, Inc. v. Ling et al (case no. 2:10-cv-00489 [MSD-DEM]), is a global trademark and cyberpiracy suit targeting websites and an individual, believed to be in China, selling knockoffs using Chanel website names and marks.  (Complaint here.)  Chanel seeks the websites, injunctive relief, trebled or statutory damages, and attorneys fees. 

With tough times, a global marketplace, and the Internet adding to the rough and tumble of business, these are just the latest examples of disputes over trademark use and protection in cyberspace.

 

Eastern District of Virginia Judge Permits Copyright and Lanham Act Claims Arising from Website "Scraping"

Any IP case that includes website "scraping", "reverse passing off" and both "clickwrap" and "browsewrap" agreements deserves a blog post.  In Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96354 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2010) (found here), U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema ruled that a plaintiff which alleged “scraping” of its website may maintain a claim for “reverse passing off” under the Lanham Act and a claim for unjust enrichment in addition to a copyright infringement claim. The Court, however, dismissed claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, Virginia’s Computer Crimes Act, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.3, and for both statutory and common law conspiracy.  Shortly after Judge Brinkema's decision, the parties entered into a consent order resolving their dispute, which can be found here.

“Scraping” a Website Database

Cvent maintains a website to assist meeting planners in locating venues for large-scale events. The website includes a database of meeting venues with detailed information about capacity, amenities and services. Eventbrite runs a competing on-line event planning website, and Cvent alleged that Eventbrite hired a third-party to “scrape”, or copy, information from Cvent’s database to create its own on-line “Venue Directory.” The gravamen of Cvent’s complaint, was “a claim for intellectual property theft and copyright infringement.” Eventbrite moved to dismiss all of the claims asserted in the Complaint except Cvent’s claim for copyright infringement.

Reverse Passing Off and Unjust Enrichment Claims Allowed to Proceed

Judge Brinkema’s ruling on Cvent’s claim for reverse passing off under the Lanham Act is perhaps the most important part of the decision because of the lack of any prior authority on this issue in the EDVA. In Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Lanham Act to “tangible goods offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept or communication embodied in those goods.” Otherwise, a Lanham Act reverse passing off claim would be indistinguishable from a copyright infringement claim.

Judge Brinkema noted a split of authority over whether a plaintiff could bring a Lanham Act claim for copying intellectual property and passing it off as one’s own. She found no controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit or prior caselaw in the EDVA on the issue. The key factor in her decision was a distinction she made between Cvent’s ideas and its product. Cvent did not allege that Eventbrite passed off its ideas as its own, but rather than it passed off Cvent’s product – its database – as its own. While Dastar referred to “tangible goods,” Judge Brinkema held that the Supreme Court used that language merely to distinguish between “goods” and “ideas” and not to exclude electronic products, such as Cvent’s database, from Lanham Act protection.

Similarly, Cvent’s unjust enrichment claim survived a preemption challenge because Cvent alleged unauthorized scraping and repackaging of its products as opposed to a copyright infringement claim based on the theft of its copyrightable ideas.

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The Federal Bar Association Presents Seminar on Eastern District of Virginia Procedure

Twombly, Iqubal, Winter, eBay and Real Truth About Obama. To many, these names make little sense, but to intellectual property litigators, they are well-known examples of the constantly changing nature of federal procedure. On September 29, a seminar sponsored by the Richmond Chapter of the Federal Bar Association offered some guidance through these cases and the procedural thicket in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The seminar, titled “Procedural Issues in Civil Litigation in the Richmond Division of the Rocket Docket,” included excellent written materials (found here) and featured a panel of speakers that included Senior U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne, David Anthony of Troutman Sanders LLP and Maya M. Eckstein of Hunton & Williams LLP.

For a recap of the panel's comments, see below. For more on litigating intellectual property cases in the Rocket Docket of the  Eastern District of Virginia, see our article found here.

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Eastern District of Virginia Judge Denies Motion to Sever Local Subsidiaries and Transfer Venue of Patent Infringement Suit

On September 23, Judge Raymond Jackson of the Eastern District of Virginia denied a motion by Verizon to sever two of its Virginia-based subsidiaries and transfer venue of a patent infringement action involving its FiOS interactive television services. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm’s., Inc., et al., Case No. 2:10cv248 (E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2010) (Jackson, J.), found here.

Verizon argued that its two Virginia subsidiaries, Verizon Virginia, Inc. and Verizon South, were “peripheral” defendants with only an indirect connection to the main claims, and so should be severed and the remaining claims transferred to New Jersey under the decision in Corry v. CFM Majestic, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 660 (E.D.Va. 1998).

Verizon claimed that the two Virginia subsidiaries should be severed because neither were responsible for the design, development, research or creation of the allegedly infringing FiOS services and relied on several Eastern District of Virginia cases in which the Court had severed claims against retailers and distributors of allegedly infringing devices.

Judge Jackson rejected this argument, finding that the two Virginia subsidiaries were not merely retailers, but were actually providing and selling the allegedly infringing services. The parent company defendants, by contrast, did not provide or offer for sale any products or services to the public, and so were less involved in the alleged infringing sales and service than the subsidiaries.

The lesson here is that a plaintiff cannot create venue in Virginia merely by suing a company’s Virginia sales subsidiary.  If the infringing acts involve provision of services by the subsidiary, however, or if the parent company has little involvement in the allegedly infringing sales, a Virginia subsidiary is enough to overcome a venue objection.