Karaoke lawsuit rocks Virginia

If you’ve ever been to a karaoke session and found yourself wanting to sue someone, here’s a lawsuit for you.
 
Just before Christmas, two related karaoke / sing-along entertainment manufacturing companies, one from North Carolina and one from Delaware, filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia (Alexandria Division) against an array of people and businesses who provide or host karaoke in the Northern Virginia and Richmond areas.  (Case no. 1:09-cv-01390; see copy of 41-page Complaint here.)

The lawsuit is an action for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1114 and 1125). 

The complaint alleges that, thanks to new technologies that make it possible to easily copy the special karaoke CDs, up to thirty illegitimate copies of new karaoke releases are created for each legitimate copy sold, causing significant losses and layoffs and an overall threat to the businesses of the two plaintiffs, Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. and Sound Choice Studios, Inc.  It further alleges that investigators for the plaintiffs “observed each of the Defendants possessing, using, or authorizing or benefiting from unauthorized counterfeit copies of at least one work bearing the” plaintiffs’ marks.

The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, the defendants’ profits, or statutory damages, treble or punitive damages, attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, and seizure of all media containing counterfeits.

No word yet on whether the lawsuit will have a soundtrack.
 

EDVA Rejects Insurance Coverage of Trademark Infringement Claim as "Advertising Injury"

Intellectual property claims are rarely covered by insurance, but some claims of trademark and copyright infringement may be covered by insurance for advertising injury.  In a January 5 decision, though, Magistrate Judge Lauck narrowly interpreted "advertising injury" coverage to exclude the duty to defend a trademark infringement claim. Premier Pet Products LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Am., Civil Action No. 3:09CV293 (Jan. 5, 2010).

In Premier Pet Products, Travelers issued an insurance policy to Premier that contained a “Web Xtend Liability” endorsement which provided coverage for “an offense committed in the course of advertising your goods, products or services” and defined advertising injury to include “infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”

Premier was sued for selling dog training collars bearing the plaintiff’s trademarked designations. The suit, however, did not specifically refer to Premier’s advertising. Rather, the plaintiff alleged liability based on Premier’s "sale" of products with plaintiff's trademarks and Premier's “use” of plaintiff’s trademarks and trade dress.

Travelers denied coverage, and Premier sued for breach of contract, seeking defense and indemnity under the policy. Judge Lauck granted summary judgment to Travelers on the duty to defend.

The key issue would appear to be whether the policy language covering “infringement of copyright, title or slogan” includes trademark infringement, and the parties extensively briefed a nationwide split of authority on that issue. Judge Lauck, though, did not reach that issue, holding instead that the Complaint did not allege (1) that Premier’s conduct occurred in the course of advertising its products, as the policy required; or (2) that Premier’s advertising activities caused the plaintiff’s harm.

On the first issue, Premier argued that the policy should be construed broadly, relying on a Fourth Circuit decision applying North Carolina law, State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Travelers, 343 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2003), which held that “the term ‘advertising’ normally refers to ‘[a]ny oral, written, or graphic statement made by the seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business.’”

Instead, Judge Lauck relied on an earlier EDVA case, Solers, Inc. v. Hartford, 146 F.Supp.2d 785, 793 (E.D.Va. 2001), which narrowly defined “advertising” under Virginia law to refer “unambiguously to the widespread definition of promotional material to the public at large, or at least to widely disseminated solicitation or promotion” and did not include one-on-one “solicitation.” The Complaint’s allegations of Premier’s “sale” of products and “use” of the plaintiff’s trademarks, the Court held “could not constitute advertising, or ‘widespread promotion’ (as opposed to sale) of goods.”

On the second issue, Judge Lauck held that the Complaint did not clearly allege that Premier’s advertising activities caused injury. Instead, the plaintiff alleged that Premier’s “sale” of products and “use” of infringing designations were the cause of its alleged injuries.

The same day, Judge Lauck issued a follow-up Order noting that she had not ruled on whether Travelers had a duty to indemnify under the policy and giving the parties thirty days to brief that issue.  Since the duty to indemnify is typically no broader than the duty to defend, though, there seems little chance that the result will change. 

Yes, Virginia, there is a cause of action for false advertising

            In the PBM Products v. Mead Johnson baby formula case (E.D. Va. case no. 3:09-cv-00269) twice previously mentioned on this blog (here and here), Chief Judge James R. Spencer delivered a gift to counsel on Christmas Eve, in the form of the second of two Christmas week opinions that provide a full discussion of and rationale for prior rulings. 

 

            This blog entry addresses a portion of that December 24th opinion [docket no. 243 on PACER/ECF, copy available here, also available at 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120200], which dealt with Mead Johnson’s summary judgment motion on PBM’s false advertising claims under the Lanham Act and for commercial disparagement under Virginia law.  The motion was denied on the former and granted on the latter.  A passage (on p.10) about the Virginia law claim may be somewhat startling at first:

 

            “As this Court has previously held, ‘the only claims for unfair competition recognized in Virginia are palming off and misappropriation of another's work.’  PBM Products. Inc. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 204 F.R.D. 71, 75 (E.D. Va. 2001).  Thus, Virginia does not recognize a cause of action for deceptive trade practices, such as false advertising.  See id.

 

            So, does this passage really mean that those who want to sue for “deceptive trade practices, such as false advertising,” are out of luck under Virginia law?  No, as explained below.

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October 2009 E.D. Va. IP litigation opinion roundup, part 2

This post continues a roundup of recent Eastern District of Virginia decisions in IP cases, covering an opinion dealing with fees and costs in a copyright infringement case.

In Quantum Sys. Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corp., case no. 1:07-cv-491, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98742 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2009), District Judge Liam O’Grady issued an opinion regarding a prior attorney’s fees and costs award that had been remanded in an unpublished opinion by the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in accordance with Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) and Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 1993) (endorsing and requiring, respectively, the consideration in making fees and costs awards of the following non-exclusive factors: (1) “the motivation of the parties”; (2) “the objective reasonableness of the legal and factual positions advanced”; and (3) “the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence”). 

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October 2009 E.D. Va. IP litigation opinion roundup, part 1

Recent decisions in IP cases in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia have not been groundbreaking, but they are good reminders of some of the nuts and bolts of IP litigation. This post covers two opinions regarding whether the Court is an appropriate forum.

In Proprietors of Strata Plan No. 36 v. Coral Gardens Resort Mgmt., Ltd., et als., case no. 1:09-cv-550, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97704 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2009), District Judge Anthony J. Trenga vacated a default judgment and dismissed a trademark infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Strata is a Turks and Caicos corporation with its principal place of business in Turks and Caicos.

To demonstrate jurisdiction, Strata alleged that the defendants (1) registered the domain name "coralgardens.com" with Network Solutions, located in Herndon, Virginia, in 1998; (2) “advertise on the coralgardens.com website, which provides a toll-free number to call from the United States and Canada ‘inviting and accepting business from the United States, including the Commonwealth of Virginia’”; (3) “have contracted to sell units at Coral Gardens in Virginia, have contracted to lease units at Coral Gardens in Virginia and have, this year, offered to contract with a Virginia resident, Mike Revell, to lease his unit at Coral Gardens”; (4) “met with Virginia residents Mike Revell and his wife in Prince William County, Virginia and agreed to sell units at Coral Gardens and lease units at Coral Gardens while in Virginia”; and (5) sent Virginia resident Mike Revell an email from an email address with the coralgardens.com domain name, soliciting rental business.

 

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Netbook Nitpicking?

Psion Netbook Pro

An interesting trademark showdown has erupted over NETBOOK, a trademark originally registered in November, 2000 by Psion PLC, and now owned by Psion Teklogix Inc.  On February 17, Dell Inc. filed a cancellation action against the mark in the TTAB, alleging that Psion committed fraud on the PTO when Psion filed its Section 8 & 15 affidavits in November, 2006, alleging that it had used the mark NETBOOK in commerce for the five years preceding November, 2006.  Dell also claims that Psion abandoned the mark by not using it since 1999. Dell's cancellation petition may be seen here.

Not to be outdone, Intel has jumped on the bandwagon and filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, also asking for Psion's trademark to be canceled because the mark has become the generic term for small, inexpensive, low power laptop computers. Intel also throws in a fraud claim as well. Intel claims that Psion discontinued the last Netbook in 2003. Based on Intel's allegations, it seems that Psion started the mess when it sent a cease and desist letter to Intel accusing the chip manufacturer of aiding and abetting manufacturers and retailers to use the mark.

Psion's nastygram campaign also included enthusiast websites that were using the mark NETBOOK. Psion also convinced Google to tell its ad customers to stop using the mark in their Google ads.

Stay tuned for more fireworks. Intel should have filed its action in the Rocket Docket so the result would be known sooner. Expect these sorts of trademark wars to break out with more frequency as consumers (and manufacturers) adopt early computing trademarks as generic terms.