Coach v. 356 Cybersquatters - Improper Joinder?

In Coach, Inc., v. 1941 coachoutletstores.com, Civil Action No. 1:11cv309 (JCC/JFA), Coach, Inc., the well-known leather goods company, sought to enjoin 356 alleged cybersquatters – almost all of which registered domain names in Hong Kong or China – from using Coach’s registered trademarks as part of the alleged cybersquatters’ domain names.  The problem from Magistrate Judge Anderson’s perspective, however, was that many of these 356 alleged cybersquatters were unrelated to each other, and therefore Coach could not meet the “transaction or occurrence” test for joinder under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. Thus, when Coach filed a motion for entry of default judgment, Magistrate Judge Anderson issued Report and Recommendation on Nov. 25, 2011, that found joinder improper as to 345 alleged cybersquatters, and recommended severing those defendants from the action. 

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Rosetta Stone Challenges Use of Trademark Language Online

Late last month, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard arguments in a case accusing search giant, Google, of violations of federal and state trademark laws when it sold keyword advertising based on Rosetta Stone's marks to competitors, some of which market counterfeit goods.

Rosetta Stone alleges a plethora of infringing practices upon Google, including:

  • Google’s practice of auctioning off trademarks to advertisers for use in their Sponsored Link titles and advertisements,
  • Google’s use of trademarks as keyword triggers,
  • Google’s inducement of third party advertisers to bid on trademarks, especially if knowing advertisers are selling counterfeit goods, and
  • Google’s exercise of control over third party text advertisements incorporating trademarks.

At the District Court, Judge Lee granted summary judgment for Google in Rosetta Stone, Ltd., v. Google, Inc., 1:09CV736 (E.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2011), therein stating no reasonable trier of fact could find consumer confusion in the use of Rosetta Stone’s trademarks in Google’s Sponsored Links, and that trademark-based keyword indexing is purely a functional and non-infringing use.

Actual Profits Award Where No Causal Connection Between Diverted Sales and Infringement

In Mazelmints, Inc. v. It’s a Wrap, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:10cv1117 (July 20, 2011), found here, Judge Liam O’Grady found against Defendant for infringing Plaintiff’s trademarks but held that the Plaintiff’s inability to prove that it was entitled to earn damages greater than the actual profits that Defendants earned from the infringing use of the marks resulted in a damages award of only $670.42.

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Court Refuses to Declare Pending Trademark Application Void or Grant Judgment on Fraudulent Procurement Claim Based on Application Alone

In Hammerhead Entertainment, L.L.C. v. Ennis, et al., Civil Action No. 4:11cv65 (July 18, 2011), found here, Judge Mark S. Davis granted default judgment and entered a permanent injunction on Hammerhead’s trademark infringement claims but refused to grant judgment for fraudulent procurement of a trademark registration or to declare defendants’ pending trademark application void.  

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A Quick Rundown of Recent Intellectual Property Decisions in the Eastern District of Virginia

It looks like summer is the time for Eastern District of Virginia judges to clear out their backlog. In addition to the recent decisions we’ve blogged about here, here and here, there have been several rulings in patent, trademark and copyright cases in the EDVA in the past ten days. Here’s a quick summary of several:

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IP Litigation on the rise in Virginia too

IPLaw360 just published an article (link below) using statistics from PACER to conclude that IP litigation is on the rise.  That made us wonder how things are going in Virginia’s federal courts.

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EDVA Court Rules Trademarks May Be "In Use" in a State Even if a Defendant Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction

In a small, but interesing decision, Chief Judge Spencer of the EDVA made clear that a plaintiff may assert state law trademark infringement claims even if the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the state at issue.  In M. Shanken Comm’s., Inc. v. Variant Events, LLC,Case No. 3:10CV804, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56138 (E.D.Va. May 25, 1011) (Spencer, J.) (found here), the plaintiff, Shanken, alleged trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition under New York law. The defendant, Variant, moved to dismiss those claims on the grounds that it did not use the marks at issue in connection with goods sold or services rendered in New York.  Variant's only connection with New York was that it had a passive website which could be accessed by New York residents, and it sent "save the date" emails, flyers and corporate sponsorship packages to organizations across the country, including New York.  Variant pointed to a prior ruling in the case in which a New York federal court ruled that these contacts were insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in federal court.

Judge Spencer denied the motion to dismiss, distinguishing between the standards for personal jurisdiction and for whether trademarks are “in use” in a state. While Variant’s passive website did not create personal jurisdiction in New York, the marks were still “in use” in New York.  While not a significant decision, it points out that a plaintiff can make use of state trademark laws from anywhere in the U.S. as long as the defendant meets the low threshold of putting the marks "in use" in that state through advertising.

Recently-filed trademark cases in the E.D. Va. focus on Web and search tactics

This past week, three new trademark infringement cases were filed in the Eastern District of Virginia.  They span the Court's three divisions and all center on web and search engine related conduct.

The first, Mazelmints, Inc. v. It's A Wrap LLC et al (case no. 1:10-cv-01117 [-LO-TRJ]), was brought by the maker of lines of novelty mints named “Engagemints” and “Announcemints” (not to mention “BarMintsVah’s”).  (Complaint here.)  When the defendant sold “Engage-mints” and “Announce-mints” on its website, www.mymint-tins.com, things turned sour.  (Sorry, couldn’t help myself.)  Although a cease-and-desist letter got a response that the defendant had removed the offending items, Mazelmints claims that the defendant is still using the terms in website metadata – read and considered by search engines as they index the site.  Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, destruction of infringing products, and damages.  With the defendants in Kentucky and the plaintiff in Maryland, it’s not entirely clear why the case finds itself in the Eastern District.

We’ve blogged recently about the RosettaStone / Google brouhaha over companies paying Google to display their ads in response to searches for trademarks that they don’t own.  Is use of website “metadata” tags analytically different?  Will courts presume that meta tags create damage, or must a litigant prove the effect on search engine results?

The second, Franko-LaFratta Construction Inc. v. Classic Kitchens of Virginia, Inc. (case no. 3:10-cv-00723 [REP]), is a cybersquatting lawsuit between renovation and design/construction companies.  (Complaint here.)  The plaintiff claims that many of the 100 website names registered by defendant’s vice-president are his competitors’ names, including in this case various forms of frankolafratta.suffix (basically all of the common suffixes but “.com”).  According to an article in Richmond BizSense that’s an exhibit to the complaint, the defendant has done so with respect to the names of other competitors too, all to increase the traffic to and visibility of defendant’s website.

Finally, the third, Chanel, Inc. v. Ling et al (case no. 2:10-cv-00489 [MSD-DEM]), is a global trademark and cyberpiracy suit targeting websites and an individual, believed to be in China, selling knockoffs using Chanel website names and marks.  (Complaint here.)  Chanel seeks the websites, injunctive relief, trebled or statutory damages, and attorneys fees. 

With tough times, a global marketplace, and the Internet adding to the rough and tumble of business, these are just the latest examples of disputes over trademark use and protection in cyberspace.

 

Eastern District of Virginia Judge Permits Copyright and Lanham Act Claims Arising from Website "Scraping"

Any IP case that includes website "scraping", "reverse passing off" and both "clickwrap" and "browsewrap" agreements deserves a blog post.  In Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96354 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2010) (found here), U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema ruled that a plaintiff which alleged “scraping” of its website may maintain a claim for “reverse passing off” under the Lanham Act and a claim for unjust enrichment in addition to a copyright infringement claim. The Court, however, dismissed claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, Virginia’s Computer Crimes Act, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.3, and for both statutory and common law conspiracy.  Shortly after Judge Brinkema's decision, the parties entered into a consent order resolving their dispute, which can be found here.

“Scraping” a Website Database

Cvent maintains a website to assist meeting planners in locating venues for large-scale events. The website includes a database of meeting venues with detailed information about capacity, amenities and services. Eventbrite runs a competing on-line event planning website, and Cvent alleged that Eventbrite hired a third-party to “scrape”, or copy, information from Cvent’s database to create its own on-line “Venue Directory.” The gravamen of Cvent’s complaint, was “a claim for intellectual property theft and copyright infringement.” Eventbrite moved to dismiss all of the claims asserted in the Complaint except Cvent’s claim for copyright infringement.

Reverse Passing Off and Unjust Enrichment Claims Allowed to Proceed

Judge Brinkema’s ruling on Cvent’s claim for reverse passing off under the Lanham Act is perhaps the most important part of the decision because of the lack of any prior authority on this issue in the EDVA. In Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Lanham Act to “tangible goods offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept or communication embodied in those goods.” Otherwise, a Lanham Act reverse passing off claim would be indistinguishable from a copyright infringement claim.

Judge Brinkema noted a split of authority over whether a plaintiff could bring a Lanham Act claim for copying intellectual property and passing it off as one’s own. She found no controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit or prior caselaw in the EDVA on the issue. The key factor in her decision was a distinction she made between Cvent’s ideas and its product. Cvent did not allege that Eventbrite passed off its ideas as its own, but rather than it passed off Cvent’s product – its database – as its own. While Dastar referred to “tangible goods,” Judge Brinkema held that the Supreme Court used that language merely to distinguish between “goods” and “ideas” and not to exclude electronic products, such as Cvent’s database, from Lanham Act protection.

Similarly, Cvent’s unjust enrichment claim survived a preemption challenge because Cvent alleged unauthorized scraping and repackaging of its products as opposed to a copyright infringement claim based on the theft of its copyrightable ideas.

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Georgia-Pacific Loses Round Two of Trademark Fight Over Paper Towels

Last month, we posted here about a the Fourth Circuit's reversal of dismissal of a trademark action brought by Georgia-Pacific to bar competitors from selling paper towels to fit in its “touchless” paper towel dispensers.

The Eighth Circuit has now weighed in and rejected similar claims by Georgia-Pacific in an Arkansas suit. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. 19246 (8th Cir. Sept. 15, 2010), found here. In Myers Supply, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding, after a bench trial, that Georgia-Pacific had failed to prove that a distributor of generic paper towels for Georgia-Pacific’s dispensers was liable for contributory trademark infringement.

In its decision, found here, the Fourth Circuit ruled only on whether Georgia-Pacific could survive summary judgment. Since the Court did not weigh the evidence or make any factual findings about the strength of Georgia-Pacific’s claims, the Eighth Circuit found the decision to be "not helpful."  In Myers Supply, on the other hand, the District Court had heard all the evidence and found that Georgia-Pacific had failed to prove a likelihood of confusion.

Key to the Eighth Circuit’s decision was evidence that it was an unobjectionable and common practice in the paper towel industry to put towels of one brand into a dispenser of another brand. Thus, the Court held, the District Court was justified in discounting survey evidence from both sides that showed a likelihood of confusion among bathroom consumers.

The flaw in the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is that industry practices do not seem probative of whether bathroom consumers are likely to be confused by the placement of generic paper towels in Georgia-Pacific’s paper towel dispensers. At bottom, the Court’s holding that evidence of a likelihood of confusion may be overcome by industry practice appears debatable, a point which Georgia-Pacific is sure to raise on remand in the Fourth Circuit action.

Fourth Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Georgia Pacific Trademark Infringement Claims

We’ve all become familiar with the “touchless” paper towel dispensers that churn out a paper towel when you wave your hands in front of the dispenser. In an August 10 decisionthe Fourth Circuit held that Georgia Pacific may assert its trademark rights to bar competitors from selling paper towels to fit in its "hands-free" towel dispensers based on post-purchase confusion of the general public who used the towel dispensers in public restrooms.

In its decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of all of Georgia Pacific’s trademark infringement and unfair competition claims against Von Drehle Corporation, which made lower quality paper towels specifically designed to fit in Georgia Pacific’s “enMotion®” touchless towel dispensers.

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Why Google Won

At the end of April, we posted about Google’s victory over Rosetta Stone in the Eastern District of Virginia suit (case no. 1:09-cv-00736) over the use of the prominent language software company’s marks in Google’s AdWords advertising program.

Judge Gerald Bruce Lee has now handed down (on August 3rd) a memorandum order and an opinion explaining his decision to grant final judgment to Google.  The case and the 58 pages of order and opinion merit in-depth analysis and discussion.  Here is a summary of the rationale to begin that conversation.

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Troutman Sanders' Virginia IP Group Receives Top Ranking in Chambers USA

Chambers and Partners' 2010 Edition of Chambers USA gives Troutman Sanders a top-level ranking for Intellectual Property in Southern Virginia, stating that the group "continues to garner praise for its litigation expertise." Virginia IP Law bloggers Robert Angle, Rob Brooke and Dabney Carr are also ranked individually in intellectual property.  A full list of Troutman Sanders' rankings can be found here.

Troutman Sanders Hosts June INTA Roundtable


Troutman Sanders LLP
 
 June INTA Roundtable 

"Practicing before the TTAB Tips and Tricks"

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is an efficient forum in which to resolve trademark disputes, but has a confusing array of rules that can be a trap for the unwary.  Attend this roundtable, sponsored by the International Trademark Association, to share your TTAB experiences with fellow practitioners.

Wednesday, June 9th 
12 p.m.
Buffet Lunch Provided
Troutman Sanders LLP
1001 Haxall Point, 15th Floor
Richmond, Virginia 23219
$45 per attendee
Please register by Wednesday, June 2nd; registration closes June 3rd 
 

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EDVA District Judge Reverses Magistrate Order Requiring a Foreign Defendant to Travel to Virginia for Deposition

In a recent trade secret case, Judge Ellis addressed an issue that often comes up in intellectual property litigation but is rarely litigated: Do out of state defendants have to come to Virginia for a deposition?

The last case that addressed this issue in Virginia was Armsey v. Medshares Mgmt., 184 F.R.D. 569 (W.D. Va. 1998), which is not only more than twelve years old, it is a magistrate’s decision, and so its precedential value was uncertain.

In Judge Ellis’ decision, In re: Outsidewall Tire Litigation, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44019 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2010) (found here), the defendants, which were based in Dubai, allegedly conspired with a former employee of the plaintiff to steal plaintiff’s tire designs. The plaintiff sought to take the depositions of the defendants in Virginia by noticing Rule 30(a)(1) depositions of the defendants’ managing agents and a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of three related corporate defendants. Notably, while the corporate defendants had been served, they had not filed counterclaims. If they had, they likely would have been subject to deposition in Virginia under E.D. Va. Local Rule 30(A).

Applying Armsey, Magistrate Judge Davis held that the witnesses had to travel to Virginia for a deposition because the witnesses frequently traveled for business (though not to Virginia) and because of the time difference between Virginia and Dubai.

Judge Ellis reversed, holding that courts have generally recognized that there is a presumption that depositions of a corporate defendant, whether under Rule 30(a)(1) or Rule 30(b)(6), should be taken at the corporation’s principal place of business. The presumption can be overcome only under special circumstances, such as:

  • When the deponent regularly conducts business in the place where the deposition is sought.
  • When the governing law of the defendant’s principal place of business would prevent the deposition or frustrate the deposing party’s legitimate discovery-related objectives.
  • Where the foreign deponents had previously disregarded deposition orders.

Judge Ellis found that Armsey properly applied the presumption, but he overruled the magistrate judge’s order because:

  • While the witnesses traveled frequently, they did not frequently come to the forum district.
  • There was no showing that Dubai law would hinder the deposition, and the defendants agreed to conduct the deposition under the Federal Rules
  • There was no evidence that disputes requiring judicial intervention were likely

Interestingly, Judge Ellis went on to state that it was appropriate for the defendants to pay the travel costs and attorneys’ fees for travel time for two of the plaintiff’s attorneys to travel to Dubai. Conversely, if the deposition had taken place in Virginia, the judge stated, the deponents travel costs would be borne by plaintiffs. While not stating a hard a fast rule, Judge Ellis’ comments about the shifting of costs could well be relevant to future cases.

Finally, the plaintiff claimed that holding the depositions in Virginia would facilitate service of process on one of the witnesses, who was named as a defendant individually. Judge Ellis rejected this argument, emphatically stating that “[f]acilitating service of process on managing agents of foreign corporations is not a legitimate reason to compel deponents to appear in Virginia.”

Google fends off Rosetta Stone

In a decision that has gotten attention from national, non-legal media (e.g., see these articles from Businessweek and CNet), Judge Gerald Bruce Lee of the Eastern District of Virginia has entered two orders that amount to a complete win for Google.

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Karaoke lawsuit rocks Virginia

If you’ve ever been to a karaoke session and found yourself wanting to sue someone, here’s a lawsuit for you.
 
Just before Christmas, two related karaoke / sing-along entertainment manufacturing companies, one from North Carolina and one from Delaware, filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia (Alexandria Division) against an array of people and businesses who provide or host karaoke in the Northern Virginia and Richmond areas.  (Case no. 1:09-cv-01390; see copy of 41-page Complaint here.)

The lawsuit is an action for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1114 and 1125). 

The complaint alleges that, thanks to new technologies that make it possible to easily copy the special karaoke CDs, up to thirty illegitimate copies of new karaoke releases are created for each legitimate copy sold, causing significant losses and layoffs and an overall threat to the businesses of the two plaintiffs, Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. and Sound Choice Studios, Inc.  It further alleges that investigators for the plaintiffs “observed each of the Defendants possessing, using, or authorizing or benefiting from unauthorized counterfeit copies of at least one work bearing the” plaintiffs’ marks.

The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, the defendants’ profits, or statutory damages, treble or punitive damages, attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, and seizure of all media containing counterfeits.

No word yet on whether the lawsuit will have a soundtrack.
 

EDVA Rejects Insurance Coverage of Trademark Infringement Claim as "Advertising Injury"

Intellectual property claims are rarely covered by insurance, but some claims of trademark and copyright infringement may be covered by insurance for advertising injury.  In a January 5 decision, though, Magistrate Judge Lauck narrowly interpreted "advertising injury" coverage to exclude the duty to defend a trademark infringement claim. Premier Pet Products LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Am., Civil Action No. 3:09CV293 (Jan. 5, 2010).

In Premier Pet Products, Travelers issued an insurance policy to Premier that contained a “Web Xtend Liability” endorsement which provided coverage for “an offense committed in the course of advertising your goods, products or services” and defined advertising injury to include “infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”

Premier was sued for selling dog training collars bearing the plaintiff’s trademarked designations. The suit, however, did not specifically refer to Premier’s advertising. Rather, the plaintiff alleged liability based on Premier’s "sale" of products with plaintiff's trademarks and Premier's “use” of plaintiff’s trademarks and trade dress.

Travelers denied coverage, and Premier sued for breach of contract, seeking defense and indemnity under the policy. Judge Lauck granted summary judgment to Travelers on the duty to defend.

The key issue would appear to be whether the policy language covering “infringement of copyright, title or slogan” includes trademark infringement, and the parties extensively briefed a nationwide split of authority on that issue. Judge Lauck, though, did not reach that issue, holding instead that the Complaint did not allege (1) that Premier’s conduct occurred in the course of advertising its products, as the policy required; or (2) that Premier’s advertising activities caused the plaintiff’s harm.

On the first issue, Premier argued that the policy should be construed broadly, relying on a Fourth Circuit decision applying North Carolina law, State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Travelers, 343 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2003), which held that “the term ‘advertising’ normally refers to ‘[a]ny oral, written, or graphic statement made by the seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business.’”

Instead, Judge Lauck relied on an earlier EDVA case, Solers, Inc. v. Hartford, 146 F.Supp.2d 785, 793 (E.D.Va. 2001), which narrowly defined “advertising” under Virginia law to refer “unambiguously to the widespread definition of promotional material to the public at large, or at least to widely disseminated solicitation or promotion” and did not include one-on-one “solicitation.” The Complaint’s allegations of Premier’s “sale” of products and “use” of the plaintiff’s trademarks, the Court held “could not constitute advertising, or ‘widespread promotion’ (as opposed to sale) of goods.”

On the second issue, Judge Lauck held that the Complaint did not clearly allege that Premier’s advertising activities caused injury. Instead, the plaintiff alleged that Premier’s “sale” of products and “use” of infringing designations were the cause of its alleged injuries.

The same day, Judge Lauck issued a follow-up Order noting that she had not ruled on whether Travelers had a duty to indemnify under the policy and giving the parties thirty days to brief that issue.  Since the duty to indemnify is typically no broader than the duty to defend, though, there seems little chance that the result will change. 

Yes, Virginia, there is a cause of action for false advertising

            In the PBM Products v. Mead Johnson baby formula case (E.D. Va. case no. 3:09-cv-00269) twice previously mentioned on this blog (here and here), Chief Judge James R. Spencer delivered a gift to counsel on Christmas Eve, in the form of the second of two Christmas week opinions that provide a full discussion of and rationale for prior rulings. 

 

            This blog entry addresses a portion of that December 24th opinion [docket no. 243 on PACER/ECF, copy available here, also available at 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120200], which dealt with Mead Johnson’s summary judgment motion on PBM’s false advertising claims under the Lanham Act and for commercial disparagement under Virginia law.  The motion was denied on the former and granted on the latter.  A passage (on p.10) about the Virginia law claim may be somewhat startling at first:

 

            “As this Court has previously held, ‘the only claims for unfair competition recognized in Virginia are palming off and misappropriation of another's work.’  PBM Products. Inc. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 204 F.R.D. 71, 75 (E.D. Va. 2001).  Thus, Virginia does not recognize a cause of action for deceptive trade practices, such as false advertising.  See id.

 

            So, does this passage really mean that those who want to sue for “deceptive trade practices, such as false advertising,” are out of luck under Virginia law?  No, as explained below.

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October 2009 E.D. Va. IP litigation opinion roundup, part 2

This post continues a roundup of recent Eastern District of Virginia decisions in IP cases, covering an opinion dealing with fees and costs in a copyright infringement case.

In Quantum Sys. Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corp., case no. 1:07-cv-491, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98742 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2009), District Judge Liam O’Grady issued an opinion regarding a prior attorney’s fees and costs award that had been remanded in an unpublished opinion by the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in accordance with Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) and Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 234 (4th Cir. 1993) (endorsing and requiring, respectively, the consideration in making fees and costs awards of the following non-exclusive factors: (1) “the motivation of the parties”; (2) “the objective reasonableness of the legal and factual positions advanced”; and (3) “the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence”). 

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October 2009 E.D. Va. IP litigation opinion roundup, part 1

Recent decisions in IP cases in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia have not been groundbreaking, but they are good reminders of some of the nuts and bolts of IP litigation. This post covers two opinions regarding whether the Court is an appropriate forum.

In Proprietors of Strata Plan No. 36 v. Coral Gardens Resort Mgmt., Ltd., et als., case no. 1:09-cv-550, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97704 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2009), District Judge Anthony J. Trenga vacated a default judgment and dismissed a trademark infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Strata is a Turks and Caicos corporation with its principal place of business in Turks and Caicos.

To demonstrate jurisdiction, Strata alleged that the defendants (1) registered the domain name "coralgardens.com" with Network Solutions, located in Herndon, Virginia, in 1998; (2) “advertise on the coralgardens.com website, which provides a toll-free number to call from the United States and Canada ‘inviting and accepting business from the United States, including the Commonwealth of Virginia’”; (3) “have contracted to sell units at Coral Gardens in Virginia, have contracted to lease units at Coral Gardens in Virginia and have, this year, offered to contract with a Virginia resident, Mike Revell, to lease his unit at Coral Gardens”; (4) “met with Virginia residents Mike Revell and his wife in Prince William County, Virginia and agreed to sell units at Coral Gardens and lease units at Coral Gardens while in Virginia”; and (5) sent Virginia resident Mike Revell an email from an email address with the coralgardens.com domain name, soliciting rental business.

 

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Netbook Nitpicking?

Psion Netbook Pro

An interesting trademark showdown has erupted over NETBOOK, a trademark originally registered in November, 2000 by Psion PLC, and now owned by Psion Teklogix Inc.  On February 17, Dell Inc. filed a cancellation action against the mark in the TTAB, alleging that Psion committed fraud on the PTO when Psion filed its Section 8 & 15 affidavits in November, 2006, alleging that it had used the mark NETBOOK in commerce for the five years preceding November, 2006.  Dell also claims that Psion abandoned the mark by not using it since 1999. Dell's cancellation petition may be seen here.

Not to be outdone, Intel has jumped on the bandwagon and filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, also asking for Psion's trademark to be canceled because the mark has become the generic term for small, inexpensive, low power laptop computers. Intel also throws in a fraud claim as well. Intel claims that Psion discontinued the last Netbook in 2003. Based on Intel's allegations, it seems that Psion started the mess when it sent a cease and desist letter to Intel accusing the chip manufacturer of aiding and abetting manufacturers and retailers to use the mark.

Psion's nastygram campaign also included enthusiast websites that were using the mark NETBOOK. Psion also convinced Google to tell its ad customers to stop using the mark in their Google ads.

Stay tuned for more fireworks. Intel should have filed its action in the Rocket Docket so the result would be known sooner. Expect these sorts of trademark wars to break out with more frequency as consumers (and manufacturers) adopt early computing trademarks as generic terms.